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“Why the Fuss?” 
STERN V. MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT’S 
UNDERSTANDING OF BANKRUPTCY COURT 
JURISDICTION 
Estragon: Let’s go.  
Vladimir:  We can’t.  
Estragon: We’re waiting for Godot.  
Vladimir:  Ah!1  
INTRODUCTION 
In the 1982 landmark case, Northern Pipeline v. 
Marathon, the Supreme Court ruled that the broad jurisdiction 
granted to bankruptcy courts under the Bankruptcy Reform Act 
of 1978 was unconstitutional.2 The Court ruled that Congress 
could not confer such broad jurisdiction on a non-Article III court 
because bankruptcy judges lack the life tenure and guaranteed 
salary that the Constitution requires of judges who exercise the 
judicial power of the United States.3 The ruling was significant 
because it marked the first time the Supreme Court had checked 
Congress’s power to create a non-Article III tribunal. In 1984, 
Congress responded by narrowing the scope of bankruptcy court 
jurisdiction. The bankruptcy community was dubious that the 
changes had solved the constitutional problems.4 In the ensuing 
years, like Samuel Beckett’s characters Estragon and Vladimir, 
bankruptcy attorneys waited for the Supreme Court to revisit 
  
 1 SAMUEL BECKETT, WAITING FOR GODOT 10 (Grove Press 1954).  
 2 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1982).  
 3 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  
 4 See Ralph Brubaker, Article III’s Bleak House (Part I): The Statutory Limits 
of Bankruptcy Judges’ Core Jurisdiction, 31 BANKR. L. LETTER No. 8, Aug. 2011, at 1-16. 
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the issue.5 At the beginning of each Supreme Court session, 
members of the bankruptcy community predicted that this 
would be the year when the Court would finally address the 
constitutionality of the bankruptcy system.6 Finally, after 
twenty-seven years of silence, the bankruptcy equivalent of 
Godot arrived in the most unlikely form—a probate dispute 
between a former Playboy model turned reality television star 
and her significantly older stepson, which ultimately was 
resolved by the Supreme Court. 
In June of 2011, the Supreme Court reexamined the 
constitutionality of bankruptcy court jurisdiction in Stern v. 
Marshall.7 The Court once again narrowed the scope of 
bankruptcy court jurisdiction and ruled that a bankruptcy 
court could not enter a final judgment on a counterclaim 
brought by Vickie Lynn Marshall—who was better known by 
her stage name, Anna Nicole Smith—against Pierce Marshall, 
the son of Vickie’s deceased husband.8 Anticipating the concern 
that Stern would cause in the bankruptcy community, Chief 
Justice Roberts repeatedly emphasized the narrowness of the 
Court’s holding.9 In the closing paragraphs of the majority 
opinion, the Chief Justice asked, “If our decision today does not 
change all that much, then why the fuss?”10  
This note attempts to answer that question. Indeed, this 
note’s thesis is that Stern does not, in fact, “change all that 
much,” but rather reflects the fact the Supreme Court is much 
“fussier” about policing the contours of bankruptcy court 
jurisdiction than it is about policing the jurisdiction of other non-
Article III tribunals. This note argues that the Supreme Court 
applies a separate, stricter, and more formal interpretation of 
Article III when scrutinizing the boundaries of bankruptcy court 
jurisdiction than it applies when performing the same kind of 
analysis with respect to other non-Article III adjudicative bodies. 
Part I of this note traces the development of the Supreme 
Court’s Article III jurisprudence with respect to the evolving 
scope of bankruptcy court jurisdiction. Part I reveals that, when 
confronted with challenges to the jurisdiction of non-Article III 
courts, the Supreme Court has historically taken a pragmatic 
  
 5 ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS 
AND CREDITORS 803, 811 (6th ed. 2009).  
 6 Id. at 811.  
 7 Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2600 (2011).  
 8 Id.  
 9 Id. at 2620.  
 10 Id.  
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approach—except in cases dealing with the judicial power of 
bankruptcy courts. Part II discusses the background, procedural 
history, and holding of Stern. Part III argues that the Court’s 
literal application of Article III in Stern v. Marshall reflects the 
analytical framework by which the Supreme Court has and will 
continue to assess the constitutionality of bankruptcy court 
jurisdiction, even as the Court continues to apply a more 
pragmatic approach in cases involving other types of non-Article 
III tribunals. Additionally, Part III attempts to explain why the 
Court has adopted this analytical framework exclusively in the 
bankruptcy court context. Part IV suggests that, despite the 
Court’s inclination to cabin the judicial power of bankruptcy 
courts, the holding of Stern is narrow. To demonstrate the likely 
limited impact of Stern on bankruptcy courts’ power to efficiently 
restructure debtor-creditor relations, Part IV analyzes Stern’s 
effect on bankruptcy courts’ authority to issue final judgments on 
fraudulent conveyance claims and on litigants’ ability to consent 
to the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts. Finally, this note 
concludes with recommendations for legislative enactments that 
could alter the Supreme Court’s approach to bankruptcy court 
jurisdiction, making it more pragmatic and deferential.  
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE III 
A literal interpretation of Article III, Section 1 of the 
U.S. Constitution is impossible. Article III, Section 1, provides: 
The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one 
Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the 
supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good 
behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a 
compensation, which shall not be diminished during their 
continuance in office.11  
However, Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution provides that 
Congress has the power “[t]o constitute tribunals inferior to the 
Supreme Court . . . . ”12 A literal reading of Congress’s Article I, 
Section 8 power to create inferior tribunals in conjunction with 
Article III’s requirements suggests that all judges vested with 
the judicial power of the United States must enjoy life tenure 
and a guaranteed salary. If this requirement were enforced, the 
multitude of Article I adjudicators now in existence would be 
  
 11 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  
 12 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.  
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out of work—including, for example, magistrate judges and 
administrative law judges, not to mention bankruptcy judges. 
Therefore, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that a 
literal interpretation of Article III is neither possible nor 
practical. Under what scholars have dubbed the “adjunct 
theory,”13 the Court has routinely permitted Congress to create 
non-Article III courts to preside over matters that traditionally 
lie within the business of Article III judges.14 This theory views 
non-Article III judges as merely “worker bees” who operate 
under the direct oversight of Article III judges.15 In order to 
ease a perpetually overcrowded federal docket, the Court has in 
all but two instances—which both involved the authority of 
bankruptcy courts—adopted a pragmatic and flexible approach 
in analyzing the requirements of Article III.  
This section will trace the development of the Court’s 
application of Article III to congressionally created adjudicative 
bodies. At first glance, the Court’s choice of factors to consider in 
determining whether a non-Article III judge may adjudicate a 
certain type of claim appears ad hoc. As Justice Scalia observed 
in his concurrence in Stern v. Marshall, these considerations 
seem “to have entered [the Court’s] jurisprudence randomly.”16 
  
 13 Professor Fallon observed that there are two lines of Supreme Court cases 
that challenge a literal interpretation of Article III. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of 
Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 
921-26 (1988). The first line of cases involve what Fallon refers to as “so-called 
‘legislative courts’—adjudicative bodies created by Congress under Article I and not 
bound by Article III’s guarantee that federal judges should enjoy life tenure and 
protection against reduction in salaries.” Id. at 921. Fallon traces the origins of 
“legislative courts” to the nineteenth century case American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 26 
U.S. 511, 545-46 (1828), in which Chief Justice Marshall “held that Congress may create 
non-Article III courts to adjudicate disputes in federal territories.” Fallon, supra, at 922. 
The second line of cases, which derived from Crowell v. Benson, 45 F.2d 66, 67 (5th Cir. 
1930), involves adjuncts and administrative agencies “established by Congress to 
administer [and adjudicate] statutory schemes of federal regulation.” Fallon, supra, at 
923. As Congress initially found constitutional authority to establish bankruptcy courts 
under the latter line of cases, id. at 928, this note will primarily focus on the interaction 
of adjunct courts and Article III. Practically speaking, however, the distinction between 
legislative courts and adjunct courts is insignificant. See Martin H. Redish, Legislative 
Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 
197, 201 (1983) (observing that, “[T]he differences between the two types of non-Article 
III bodies are, at least for constitutional purposes, superficial.”).  
 14 See Redish, supra note 13, at 198. “[S]ince early in the nation’s history, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that Congress may, as an exercise of one or another of 
its enumerated powers, create courts whose judges do not receive the Article III salary 
and tenure protections.” Such courts are commonly referred to as “Article I” or 
“legislative” courts. Id.  
 15 LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 94 (3d ed. 2009) (“If [non-Article III 
courts] perform adjudicative duties for Article III courts, there is no serious conflict 
with Article III, and the separation of powers is preserved.”).  
 16 Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2621 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
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However, the Court’s seemingly scatter-shot approach to Article 
III jurisprudence appears less random and more coherent when 
viewed with an understanding that the Court scrutinizes the 
adjudicative authority of bankruptcy courts more closely than 
it does other non-Article III tribunals. The canonical cases 
demonstrate that the Court applies a bifurcated approach, 
whereby it rubber-stamps Congressional decisions to delegate 
adjudicative authority to non-Article III tribunals, except in 
cases involving the judicial power of bankruptcy judges.  
A. Crowell v. Benson: The Court Adopts a Pragmatic 
Approach to Article III 
The first major Supreme Court opinion of the modern 
era in which the Court employed a pragmatic, rather than 
literal, approach to Article III was Crowell v. Benson.17 In 
Crowell, J.B. Knudsen, a longshoreman, was injured while 
working on a derrick barge owned by his employer, Charles 
Benson. The barge was moored in the Mobile River in Alabama.18 
Knudsen brought a claim against Benson under the 1927 
Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act.19 Deputy Commissioner 
Crowell of the U.S. Employees’ Compensation Commission 
adjudicated the claim, finding in favor of Knudsen and awarding 
him damages.20 In the district court, Benson challenged the 
enforcement of the award on the ground that Knudsen was not 
acting within the scope of his employment at the time of his 
injury and that therefore the claim “was not within the 
jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner.”21 The district court 
ordered a hearing so that it could review de novo the 
determination of law made by the Deputy Commissioner.22 
Subsequently, the district court reversed the Deputy 
Commissioner’s decision, vacating the award on the ground 
that Knudsen was not in the employ of Benson at the time of 
the injury.23 The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, and the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari.24  
  
 17 285 U.S. 22, 56-58 (1932).  
 18 Crowell v. Benson, 45 F.2d 66, 67 (5th Cir. 1930).  
 19 Crowell, 285 U.S. at 36-37.  
 20 Id.  
 21 Id. at 37 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 22 Id.  
 23 Id.  
 24 Id.  
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The question confronting the Court was whether 
“Congress may substitute for constitutional courts, in which 
the judicial power of the United States is vested, an 
administrative agency—in this instance a single deputy 
commissioner—for the final determination of [a question of 
fact].”25 Thus, the Court addressed whether a non-Article III 
federal tribunal could constitutionally adjudicate a federal 
claim between two private parties. The Court had a choice. 
First, the Court could adopt a literal interpretation of Article 
III, ruling that any federal adjudicative body that did not 
satisfy the literal requirements of Article III was 
unconstitutional. Alternatively, the Court could harmonize 
Articles I and III by adopting a practical interpretation of 
Article III. The Court chose the latter approach, ruling that 
administrative law courts are “instruments” of and subject to 
review by Article III courts.26 The Court acknowledged the 
“utility and convenience of administrative agencies for the 
investigation and finding of facts within their proper province,” 
but, notably, the Court considered the possibility that the 
power of non-Article III tribunals needed some limitations.27 In 
order to strike the proper balance, the Court took its cue from 
the federal statute, which authorized only Article III courts to 
enforce an employee’s claim for damages against his employer. 
The Court devised a compromise that made available to 
workers, such as Knudsen, expedited administrative review of 
their claims, while providing Article III courts the authority to 
supervise the decisions and enforce the awards of adjudicative 
bodies that Congress had provisionally vested with the judicial 
power of the United States.28  
In balancing the complexities of the modern 
administrative state with the Court’s obligation to adhere to 
Article III’s explicit commands, the Court distinguished 
between the determination of questions of fact and questions of 
law made by administrative courts. The Court explained that 
“[t]here is no requirement that, in order to maintain the 
essential attributes of the judicial power, all determinations of 
  
 25 Id. at 56.  
 26 YACKLE, supra note 15, at 96.  
 27 Crowell, 285 U.S. at 57.  
 28 As Professor Judith Resnik observes, “In a Solominic move, the Court ‘split 
the difference;’ it upheld Congress’ decision to place adjudicatory power in a non-Article 
III institution and yet simultaneously permitted the Article III judge’s ruling to stand, 
and Benson, the employer, to prevail.” Judith Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article III 
Courts, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 581, 594 (1985).  
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fact in constitutional courts shall be made by judges.”29 The 
Court ruled that, upon review, the factual findings of 
administrative law judges “shall be final” so long as they are 
“supported by evidence and within the scope of [the judge’s] 
authority,”30 but Article III courts would conduct a de novo 
review of any determinations of law.31 
B. United States v. Raddatz: The Federal Magistrate 
System Affirmed  
Magistrate judges have been around in one form or 
another since the Judiciary Act of 1789.32 They possessed only 
very limited authority, however, until Congress incrementally 
expanded it by enacting several pieces of legislation during the 
  
 29 Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51.  
 30 Id. at 46. (“[T]here can be no doubt that the act contemplates that as to 
questions of fact, airing with respect to injuries to employees within the purview of the 
act, the findings of the deputy commissioner, supported by evidence and within the 
scope of his authority, shall be final. To hold otherwise would be to defeat the obvious 
purpose of the legislation to furnish a prompt, continuous, expert, and inexpensive 
method for dealing with a class of questions of fact which are peculiarly suited to 
examination and determination by an administrative agency specifically assigned to 
that task.”); see also Henry Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of 
Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1375 (1953) (“[T]he 
apparently solid thing about Crowell is the holding that administrative findings of non-
constitutional and jurisdictional facts may be made conclusive upon the courts, if not 
infected with any error of law, as a basis for judicial enforcement of a money liability of 
one private person to another.”).  
 31 Crowell, 285 U.S. at 64. At Harvard Law School in the 1950s, Professor 
Henry Hart warned students in his Federal Courts class that, while reading Crowell, to 
not make the “simple mistake[]” of “concentrat[ing] on what [the Court] said Congress 
could not do.” Hart, supra note 30, at 1374-75 (emphasis added). Professor Hart was 
referring to the perception that, post-Crowell, the Court had seemingly reduced 
administrative law judges to mere fact-finders whose declarations of law would not 
carry weight upon review in an Article III court. Rather, Crowell revealed that the 
Court was willing to take a pragmatic approach to Article III and not require Congress 
to adhere to its literal requirements. Since then, there has been a proliferation of 
administrative law judges throughout the federal system. As of the year 2000, the 
federal government employed nearly 1300 administrative law judges. See RICHARD H. 
FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 367 (5th ed. 2003). Crowell’s legacy is evident in how Article III judges have 
come to rely on their Article I counterparts to keep a backlogged judicial system 
moving. Indeed, observing the impact of Crowell, Professor Fallon, notes,  
[T]he legal doctrine validating adjudication by administrative agencies 
establishes the impracticability of Article III literalism . . . . Anticipating the 
vital role of administrative adjudication, Crowell sought to preserve the role 
of the article III courts not by excluding agencies from adjudication 
altogether, but by requiring de novo review of the most important agency 
decisions in private cases.  
Fallon, supra note 13, at 925.  
 32 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 stat. 73. 
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1960s and 1970s, culminating with the passage of the 1979 
Federal Magistrates Act.33 The Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the newly redesigned and more robust 
magistrate system in United States v. Raddatz, reasoning that 
Congress’s approach “strikes the proper balance between the 
demands of due process and the constraints of Art. III.”34  
Raddatz was indicted for receiving a firearm in violation of 
a federal statute.35 Before trial, Raddatz filed a motion to suppress 
certain inculpatory statements he made to federal officers.36 The 
district court referred the motion to a magistrate.37 After holding 
an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate recommended in his 
report and findings that the motion to suppress be denied.38 On 
appeal, the district court reviewed de novo the record of the 
hearing and accepted the magistrate’s recommendation.39 Raddatz 
was found guilty and appealed from the district court judgment 
on the ground “that the review procedures established by 
§ 636(b)(1) permitting the district court judge to make a de novo 
determination of contested credibility assessments without 
personally hearing the live testimony, violated . . . Art. III of 
the United States Constitution.”40 The Supreme Court 
disagreed, reasoning that although the district judge could 
choose to hold a de novo evidentiary hearing, Article III did not 
compel the district judge to “personally . . . hear the controverted 
testimony” so as “to make an independent evaluation of 
  
 33 The Federal Magistrate Act of 1968 authorized magistrates “to serve as 
special masters, to provide ‘assistance to district judges in the conduct of pretrial 
discovery proceedings in civil or criminal actions,’ and to conduct ‘preliminary review of 
motions for posttrial Relief[.]’” FALLON ET AL., supra note 31, at 404. Amendments 
enacted in 1976 expanded the authority of magistrate judges even further. See 28 
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (2006). Significantly, a magistrate judge’s finding under 
§ 636(b)(1)(A) is subject to review only under the highly deferential “clearly erroneous” 
standard. Moreover, an Article III judge may authorize a magistrate judge to “conduct 
hearings, including evidentiary hearings.” Id. § 636(b)(1)(B). However, the magistrate 
judge may only make “proposed findings of fact” on such “dispositive” motions “with the 
presiding judge still required to make a ‘de novo’ determination of those findings to 
which objections is raised.” FALLON ET AL., supra note 31, at 404. Under the 1979 Act, 
with the consent of the parties, magistrate judges could now “conduct any or all 
proceedings in a jury trial or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in 
the case, when specifically designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district 
court.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). Losing parties could then appeal to the Circuit Court of 
Appeals. Id. § 636(c)(3).  
 34 United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 683-84 (1980).  
 35 Id. at 669.  
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 671-72.  
 39 Id. at 672.  
 40 Id. at 677. Raddatz also alleged a violation of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment, which the Court ultimately rejected. Id. at 680-81.  
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credibility.”41 The district judge had the discretion to determine 
how much “weight” to give the magistrate’s “proposed findings 
of facts and recommendations.”42 Ultimately, the Court held 
that no Article III violation occurred because Raddatz’s 
evidentiary hearing took place “under the district court’s total 
control and jurisdiction.”43 Although magistrate judges have 
power to propose findings and recommendations on a broad 
variety of claims and motions, Congress had ensured that the 
presiding district court judge, as in Crowell, retained the final 
word on such decisions.44 
C. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe 
Line Co. 
In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe 
Line Co.,45 the Supreme Court for the first time invalidated the 
adjudicative authority of a non-Article III federal tribunal. To 
understand the full significance of the Court’s decision in Northern 
Pipeline, a brief detour through the history of the perpetually 
shifting contours of bankruptcy court jurisdiction is required.  
1. The Origin of Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction  
Until the passage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the 
1898 Act), except in the cases of a handful of responses to 
periodic financial panics that occurred during the nineteenth 
century, Congress did not make broad use of its Article I, 
  
 41 Id. at 672-73. 
 42 Id. at 683.  
 43 Id. at 681-84 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Thus, although the statute 
permits the district court to give the magistrate’s proposed findings of fact and 
recommendations ‘such weight as [their] merit commands and the sound discretion of 
the judge warrants,’ . . . that delegating does not violate Art. III so long as the ultimate 
decision is made by the court.”). The fact that the district court retains the ultimate 
control is central to why the Court approved of the magistrate system. See id. at 684-86 
(“[W]e confront a procedure under which Congress has vested in Art. III judges the 
discretionary power to delegate certain functions to competent and impartial 
assistants, while ensuring that the judges retain complete supervisory control over the 
assistants’ activities.”).  
 44 See id. at 681 (upholding the 1976 amendments to the Federal Magistrates 
Act because the “[decision-making process of magistrates] takes place under the 
district court’s total control and jurisdiction”). Congress heard Crowell’s holding loud 
and clear when it expanded the power of magistrate judges. According to Professor 
Resnik, “Congress . . . mimicked the Crowell dependency model (deputy commissioner 
as supervised by and reliant upon an Article III judge) when it authorized increased 
powers for magistrates.” Resnik, supra note 28, at 596. 
 45 See generally N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 
50 (1982).  
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Section 8 power “[t]o establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject 
of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”46 The 1898 Act 
designated the district courts as “courts of bankruptcy” and 
authorized them to appoint bankruptcy “referees” for six-year 
terms to preside over bankruptcy proceedings within each 
district.47 Bankruptcy referees did not become known as 
“bankruptcy judges” until the Supreme Court promulgated the 
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure in 1973.48  
Under the 1898 Act, the scope of jurisdiction confided to 
bankruptcy referees was, according to Professors Warren and 
Westbrook, “arcane and confusing.”49 The 1898 Act distinguished 
between proceedings that fell within the “plenary jurisdiction” of 
the district court and those that fell within the “summary 
jurisdiction” of the bankruptcy court.50 In this “convoluted, 
bifurcated scheme,” actions that were within the court’s “plenary 
jurisdiction” were ordinary civil actions that could only be 
adjudicated in an Article III district court, whereas actions 
within the court’s “summary jurisdiction” were bankruptcy-
related actions that the bankruptcy court had authority to hear 
and decide.51 In essence, bankruptcy referees had authority to 
hear and enter final judgments in proceedings directly related 
to bankruptcy proceedings, in proceedings directly related to 
liquidating the debtor’s property and distributing it to 
creditors, and, upon the consent of the parties, in proceedings 
involving nonbankruptcy claims that would otherwise fall 
within the plenary jurisdiction of the district court.52  
In practice, however, the authority of bankruptcy 
referees was less clear than these labels might suggest, and 
bankruptcy court jurisdiction was persistently challenged by 
nondebtors, who sought to avoid litigating in bankruptcy courts 
by claiming that they had not truly consented to bankruptcy 
court jurisdiction or that their claims or the trustee’s claims 
  
 46 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See generally Ralph Brubaker, On the Nature of 
Federal Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A General Statutory and Constitutional Theory, 41. 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 768 (2000) (“Bankruptcy would not become a permanent 
institution in this country until 1898.”); Vern Countryman, Scrambling to Define 
Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: The Chief Justice, The Judicial Conference, and the Legislative 
Process, 22 HARV. J. LEGIS. 1, 2-12 (1985); Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the 
Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 6-32 (1995). 
 47 Countryman, supra note 46, at 2-12. 
 48 Id.  
 49 WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 5, at 800.  
 50 See generally Countryman, supra note 46, at 2-3. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 2-12. See infra Part IV.B for a discussion of the abilities of parties to 
consent to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.  
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against them were not related to the bankruptcy.53 According to 
a report of the House Committee on the Judiciary, the division 
of jurisdiction under the 1898 Act caused several problems: 
The first is delay. Not only are the proceedings in non-bankruptcy 
cases likely to be paced more slowly with longer intervals between 
successive steps, but the dockets of the non-bankruptcy courts are 
likely to be more crowded . . . . Another objection . . . is the extra 
expense entailed by the estate in litigating outside the bankruptcy 
court . . . . The most serious objection . . . is the frequent, time-
consuming, and expensive litigation of the question whether the 
bankruptcy court has jurisdiction of a particular proceeding.54 
In 1978, Congress undertook the first comprehensive 
overhaul of federal bankruptcy law since the 1898 law was 
enacted. In designing the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the 
1978 Act), Congress set out to resolve the confusion and 
procedural difficulties created by the 1898 Act, especially the 
confusion that had resulted from the 1898 Act’s bewildering 
distinction between plenary and summary jurisdiction. Following 
what it believed to be the path carved by the Court’s affirmation 
of the adjunct theory in Crowell and Raddatz, Congress 
established “in each judicial district, as an adjunct to the district 
court for such district, a bankruptcy court which shall be a 
court of record known as the United States Bankruptcy Court 
for the district.”55 The 1978 Act authorized the President, with 
the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint bankruptcy 
judges.56 Unlike district court judges, however, bankruptcy 
judges would enjoy neither the Article III protection of lifetime 
tenure—they would serve fourteen-year terms—nor the 
protection of a guaranteed salary.57 The 1978 Act provided that 
all decisions by the bankruptcy court were subject to appellate 
review within each federal circuit.58  
In an attempt to simplify and expand the jurisdiction of 
bankruptcy courts, the 1978 Act granted bankruptcy courts 
authority over “all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or 
  
 53 See Countryman, supra note 46, at 2-12.  
 54 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 44-45 (1977).  
 55 28 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1982). Bankruptcy Court judges are subject to removal 
by the “judicial counsel of the circuit” on account of “incompetency, misconduct, neglect 
of duty, or physical or mental disability.” Id.  
 56 Id. §§ 152-153.  
 57 See id. §§ 152-154. See infra Part III.D for a discussion on the debate 
concerning whether to grant Article III status to bankruptcy judges which arose in the 
lead up to passing the 1978 Act.  
 58 See generally N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 
50, 55 (1982) (describing the review process for bankruptcy appeals).  
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arising in or related to cases under title 11.”59 Although, as 
Professor Brubaker has pointed out, “[Congress], somewhat 
ironically, thought that the powerful breadth of the jurisdictional 
provisions would ‘leave no doubt as to the scope of the 
bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over disputes,’”60 the bankruptcy 
community’s understanding of the constitutional power of the 
bankruptcy court was about to be thrown into flux.61  
2. Northern Pipeline v. Marathon 
In a surprising move that caught Congress and 
bankruptcy lawyers off guard,62 the Court held that the judicial 
power vested in bankruptcy judges under the 1978 Act violated 
Article III and thus was unconstitutional.63 The facts of the case 
are straightforward. After Northern Pipeline Construction 
Company (Northern Pipeline) filed a Chapter 11 petition in the 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota, it commenced 
a common law breach of contract action against Marathon 
Pipeline Company (Marathon) in bankruptcy court.64 Marathon 
moved to dismiss the suit, asserting that the 1978 Act’s 
conferral of jurisdiction to a federal bankruptcy court to hear a 
state common law contract claim violated Article III’s 
requirement that the judicial power of the United States be 
vested only in judges who enjoy lifetime tenure and a 
guaranteed salary.65 
Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice Brennan 
recounted why the Framers had intentionally distributed 
  
 59 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (1982) (amended 1984).  
 60 Brubaker, supra note 46, at 799 (footnote omitted). 
 61 The 1970 National Bankruptcy Review Commission recommended to 
Congress that the reformulated bankruptcy courts receive a broad grant of jurisdiction. 
NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 727 (1997). 
According to the 1970 Commission Report:  
The constitutionality of a grant of jurisdiction in such comprehensive terms 
should not be subject to any serious doubt. The jurisdictional grants to the 
court of bankruptcy by the Acts of 1841 and 1867 were almost as extensive, 
and the Supreme Court gave the provisions of those Acts generous 
construction and approval of their constitutionality. There appears to be no 
reason why Congress cannot in the exercise of its power under the 
Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution confer jurisdiction over all litigation 
having a significant connection with bankruptcy.  
Id.  
 62 Id.  
 63 N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 50.  
 64 Id. at 56-57.  
 65 Id.  
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power among the tripartite federal government and concluded 
that Article III is “an inseparable element of the constitutional 
system of checks and balances.”66 Justice Brennan stated that 
“[t]he judicial power of the United States must be exercised by 
courts having the attributes prescribed in Art. III.”67 The 
“attributes” to which Justice Brennan referred were the 
Constitution’s explicit requirement that judges exercising the 
judicial power of the United States enjoy life tenure and a 
guaranteed salary. Justice Brennan explained that the 
requirements of Article III operate as a structural safeguard to 
ensure that the judiciary remains truly fair and independent.68 
Inasmuch as the 1978 Act provided that bankruptcy judges 
would be appointed for fixed terms, Justice Brennan concluded, 
“There is no doubt that the bankruptcy judges created by the 
Act are not Art. III judges.”69  
In what appears to be a dramatic about-face from prior 
precedent, the four-Justice plurality declared that Congress’s 
authority to delegate adjudicative power to non-Article III 
tribunals “reduce[s] to three narrow situations,” which include 
the authority to create “territorial courts,” the authority to 
adjudicate court martial proceedings, and the authority to 
adjudicate cases involving “public rights.”70 Although the Court’s 
turn toward a literal application of Article III signified a 
departure from the more pragmatic approach it had adopted in 
Crowell and Raddatz, the Court’s newfound appreciation for 
formalism should not be overstated. Significantly, the plurality’s 
formal understanding of Article III and its limited approval of 
Congress’s authority to create non-Article III tribunals lacked 
support among the other five Justices and thus failed to become 
controlling law.71 The only point that a majority of the Justices 
did agree on was the decision to invalidate the 1978 Act’s broad 
jurisdictional grant to the bankruptcy courts because Congress 
had unconstitutionally vested the essential attributes of judicial 
power in a non-Article III court.72  
  
 66 Id. at 58.  
 67 Id. at 59.  
 68 Id. at 60-61. 
 69 Id.  
 70 Id. at 64-67. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 86.  
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3. The Fallout from Northern Pipeline 
In response to Northern Pipeline, Congress enacted the 
1984 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 
1984 (the 1984 Amendments).73 The 1984 Amendments 
narrowed the 1978 Act’s broad grant of jurisdiction to 
bankruptcy courts by distinguishing between “core” and “non-
core” claims.74 Bankruptcy judges were given authority to enter 
orders and final judgments with respect to “core” claims. With 
respect to claims that were “non-core-but-related-to” the 
bankruptcy case, bankruptcy courts were authorized only to 
make proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law that 
would be reviewed de novo by district courts.75 However, 
following the magistrate model and the long-standing tradition 
of consent under the old referee system, Congress authorized 
bankruptcy judges to enter final judgment on “non-core-but-
related-to” claims so long as both parties consented.76  
In the immediate aftermath of Northern Pipeline, 
scholars predicted disastrous consequences for the future of 
bankruptcy proceedings.77 In reality, however, business in the 
bankruptcy courts continued as usual under the 1984 
Amendments. Over the coming decades, Northern Pipeline 
never became the life-altering event that bankruptcy experts 
had initially predicted.78 Although Northern Pipeline has never 
been explicitly overruled, two subsequent opinions appeared to 
limit Northern Pipeline to its facts and offer a more functional 
understanding of Article III than the plurality adopted in 
Northern Pipeline. 
  
 73 See Tabb, supra note 46, at 38-40. 
 74 28 U.S.C. § 157 (2006). Under § 157(b), Congress provided a non-
exhaustive list of core claims. See id.  
 75 Id. § 157(c)(1).  
 76 Id. § 157(c)(2).  
 77 In the year following Northern Pipeline, Professor Redish predicted, “The 
Northern Pipeline decision creates serious and acute problems for Congress and for the 
future of all federal bankruptcy adjudication.” Redish, supra note 13, at 204. 
Furthermore, after discussing the perceived consequences of Northern Pipeline, 
Professor King declared, “The Supreme Court has created a mess.” Lawrence P. King, 
The Unmaking of a Bankruptcy Court: Aftermath of Northern Pipeline v. Marathon, 40 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 99, 117-18 (1983).  
 78 Professor McKenzie observes, “The doctrinal developments after Northern 
Pipeline, as well as the de facto development of bankruptcy court practice since that 
time, have resurrected much of the autonomy that Congress granted to bankruptcy 
judges in 1978 and that the Supreme Court had attempted to quash.” Troy A. 
McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy Courts, 62 STAN. L. 
REV. 747, 766 (2010).  
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D. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co. 
Just three years after its decision in Northern Pipeline, the 
Court returned to a pragmatic approach to Article III. In Thomas 
v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co.,79 the Court affirmed 
Congress’s ability to authorize the use of binding arbitration to 
resolve disputes arising from a federal cause of action.80  
The case involved the data-consideration and data-
compensation provision (the provision) of the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).81 FIFRA provides that 
to obtain Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approval of a 
pesticide, manufacturers must “submit research data to the 
[EPA] concerning the product’s health, safety, and environmental 
effects.”82 If a competing manufacturer subsequently applies for 
EPA approval of a similar product, the EPA may use the first 
company’s research to assess the competitor’s product.83 But to 
prevent free riding, FIFRA requires that the competitor 
provide adequate compensation to the company that produced 
the research.84 If the competitors cannot agree on an 
appropriate amount of compensation, the statute provides that 
“either [party] may invoke binding arbitration. The arbitrator’s 
decision is subject to judicial review only for ‘fraud, 
misrepresentation, or other misconduct.’”85  
Initially, the plaintiffs—a group of thirteen pesticide 
manufacturers—brought a claim against the EPA, challenging 
the provision’s constitutionality under Article I and the Fifth 
Amendment.86 In the wake of the Court’s decision in Northern 
Pipeline, however, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to 
include allegations that the FIFRA’s use of binding arbitration to 
resolve disputes among competitors violated Article III because 
FIFRA “allocate[s] to arbitrators the functions of judicial officers 
[while] severely limiting review by an Article III court.”87 
The tone of the Court’s opinion, written by Justice 
O’Connor, differs drastically from the tone adopted by the 
Court in Northern Pipeline. Instead of rhapsodizing on the 
  
 79 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agr. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985).  
 80 Id. at 569.  
 81 Id. at 571. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 571-75.  
 84 Id. at 572-73.  
 85 Id. at 573-74.  
 86 Id. at 575-76.  
 87 Id. at 576. 
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sanctity of Article III in the introductory paragraphs, as 
Justice Brennan did in Northern Pipeline, the Court 
emphatically embraced a functional approach to Article III 
jurisprudence with the declaration that “[a]n absolute 
construction of Article III is not possible.”88 The Court narrowly 
limited the holding of Northern Pipeline, stating that the “case 
establishes only that Congress may not vest in a non-Article III 
court the power to adjudicate, render final judgment, and issue 
binding orders in a traditional contract action arising under 
state law, without consent of the litigants, and subject only to 
ordinary appellate review.”89 Although both Crowell and 
Thomas seemingly dealt with state common law claims—
respectively, a contract dispute between an employee and 
employer, and a dispute over a property interest—the Court 
distinguished both cases from Northern Pipeline. The defining 
characteristic enabling Congress to channel both claims to non-
Article III courts is that in each instance a federal statute 
“displaced a traditional cause of action and affected a pre-
existing relationship based on a common-law” claim.90 
Significantly, Justice O’Connor cast Thomas as reflecting “the 
enduring lesson of Crowell,” and in so doing, focused on the 
“substance” of FIFRA in order to determine whether it 
contravened Article III.91 The Court abandoned a formal 
reading of Article III and instead balanced the “substance” of 
the delegation of adjudicatory authority against the purpose 
behind Article III’s safeguards of a guaranteed salary and life 
tenure to assess whether Congress’s decision to delegate 
damaged the integrity and independence of the judiciary.92  
E. Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor 
Four years after Northern Pipeline, the Supreme Court 
confronted another instance of a non-Article III tribunal 
adjudicating a state common law claim. In 1974, when 
Congress revamped the Commodities Exchange Act (CEA), it 
created the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
to oversee the implementation of the regulatory regime.93 The 
CFTC was charged with adjudicating certain disputes between 
  
 88 Id. at 583.  
 89 Id. at 584-85.  
 90 Id. at 587.  
 91 Id. at 584-87.  
 92 Id. at 590-91.  
 93 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 836-38 (1986).  
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professional commodity brokers and their disgruntled clients 
arising from alleged violations of the CEA. Two years later, in 
1976, the “CFTC promulgated a regulation” enabling it “to 
adjudicate counterclaims arising out of the transaction or 
occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences set forth in 
the complaint.”94 Such counterclaims included state common 
law counterclaims. Of course, the ruling in Northern Pipeline a 
few years later arguably called the constitutionality of the 
CFTC’s authority to adjudicate state common law 
counterclaims into question.  
Schor, an investor, filed a complaint with the CFTC 
against ContiCommodity Services, Inc. (Conti), a brokerage 
house.95 Schor alleged that his debit balance resulted from 
Conti’s violations of the CEA.96 Unaware that Schor had filed a 
claim with the CFTC, “Conti . . . filed a diversity action in 
federal district court to recover the debit balance.”97 Schor then 
filed a counterclaim in Conti’s district court suit, alleging the 
same CEA violations that were the subject of the CFTC 
proceeding.98 Eventually, Conti voluntarily dismissed its claim 
in federal court and agreed to litigate Schor’s claim before the 
CFTC.99 Conti asserted its claim to recover the debit balance in 
the form of a counterclaim in Schor’s CFTC action.100 The 
administrative law judge found in favor of Conti on both 
Schor’s claim and Conti’s counterclaim.101 On appeal, in the 
aftermath of Northern Pipeline, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit ruled that the CFTC’s authority to adjudicate 
a state common law counterclaim was unconstitutional.102 The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue.  
Again writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor 
acknowledged that the Court’s ad hoc approach to Article III, 
from Crowell to Thomas, does “not admit of easy synthesis.”103 
This time, however, the Court formally introduced a 
multifactor balancing test to determine whether Congress has 
constitutionally authorized a non-Article III tribunal to 
adjudicate the business of Article III Courts, or whether 
  
 94 Id. at 837. 
 95 Id.  
 96 Id.  
 97 Id.  
 98 Id. at 837-38.  
 99 Id. at 838.  
 100 Id.  
 101 Id.  
 102 Id. at 848-59.  
 103 Id. at 847. 
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Congress has acted in a way that “impermissibly threatens the 
institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch.”104 The Court 
identified several factors that should be considered, with no 
single factor being solely determinative. Thus, a court should 
consider: (1) “the extent to which the ‘essential attributes of 
judicial power’ are reserved to Article III courts”; (2) “conversely, 
the extent to which the non-Article III forum exercises the range 
of jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Article III 
courts”; (3) “the origins and importance of the right to be 
adjudicated”; and (4) “the concerns that drove Congress to 
depart from the requirements of Article III.”105 Applying this 
new balancing test to the facts of Schor, the Court concluded 
that the CFTC’s authority over a limited class of state law 
claims did not violate the structural integrity of Article III.106  
II. STERN V. MARSHALL: THE SUPREME COURT ONCE AGAIN 
NARROWS THE SCOPE OF BANKRUPTCY COURT 
JURISDICTION 
A. The Love of the Last Tycoon 
In the early 1990s, before finding fame as a model and 
reality television star under the stage name Anna Nicole 
Smith, twenty-four-year-old Vickie Lynn Marshall worked the 
day shift as a table dancer at Gigi’s, a gentlemen’s club in 
Houston.107 Vickie found herself working as a stripper out of a 
desperate need to pay her bills and support her son.108 Born in 
1905, the blue-blooded J. Howard Marshall had, over a lifetime 
in the oil and natural gas industry, amassed a fortune that 
made him one of the 400 richest people in America and the 
richest man in Texas.109 By October of 1991, as he mourned the 
recent deaths of both his wife of thirty years and his mistress of 
ten years, the heartbroken octogenarian had, by all accounts, 
  
 104 Id. at 851. As Professor Yackle observed, the Court’s application of a 
balancing test on a case-by-case basis “is not the most intellectually satisfying analysis 
of constitutional questions.” YACKLE, supra note 15, at 111. Although the Court’s 
precedents do not form a neat narrative, as Justice O’Connor admits, perhaps a close 
factual inquiry on a case-by-case basis is preferable to the adoption of a bright-line rule 
when the stakes are so high—as they are in all of these Article III disputes.  
 105 Schor, 478 U.S. at 851. 
 106 Id. at 857.  
 107 For a thorough history of the lives of J. Howard and Vickie, see generally 
In re Marshall, 275 B.R. 5, 11-25 (C.D. Cal. 2002).  
 108 Id. at 20.  
 109 Id. at 11, 18.  
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lost the will to live.110 At the suggestion of his chauffeur, who 
had hoped to lift his boss’s spirits, J. Howard made a fortuitous 
daytime trip to Gigi’s.111 There, J. Howard met Vickie and was 
smitten.112 Within a week, J. Howard told Vickie of his plans to 
marry her.113 For over two years, Vickie rebuffed J. Howard’s 
proposals of marriage, but she finally agreed to marry him, 
which resulted in their wedding in June of 1994.114 In August 
1995, J. Howard died of heart failure.115 Although J. Howard 
had spent his final years spending millions of dollars on Vickie, 
he failed to include her in his will.116 She claimed that she was 
entitled to half of J. Howard’s estate. Her significantly older 
stepson, Pierce Marshall, the younger of J. Howard’s two sons, 
vigorously resisted her claim.  
B. The Procedural History of Stern v. Marshall 
An analysis of the contentious and lengthy legal battle 
between Vickie and Pierce is worthy of its own epic work.117 For 
that reason, this note will focus only on one strand of the 
litigation.118 Shortly before J. Howard’s death in 1995, Vickie 
brought a claim for tortious interference against Pierce in 
Texas state probate court.119 Vickie alleged that Pierce had 
fraudulently induced J. Howard on his deathbed to transfer all 
his assets to a living trust.120 Pierce denied the allegation and 
contended that J. Howard had intended that he be the sole 
beneficiary of the estate.121 Deprived of the inheritance that she 
expected to receive, and defending a lawsuit brought against 
her by a former employee,122 Vickie filed a bankruptcy petition 
in the Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California 
(the Bankruptcy Court) in January of 1996.123 In May of the 
  
 110 Id. at 13, 16-17, 20-21.  
 111 Id. at 21.  
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 23.  
 115 See id. at 33.  
 116 Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 300 (2006). 
 117 For a discussion of the lengthy dispute between Vickie and Pierce that has 
been litigated in several state and federal courts, see generally id. at 300-05.  
 118 Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).  
 119 See id. at 2601. 
 120 Id.  
 121 Id.  
 122 Brubaker, supra note 4, at 3. 
 123 Voluntary Petition Under Chapter 11, In re Marshall, 253 B.R. 550 (C.D. 
Cal. 2000) (No. 2:96-BK-12510).  
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same year, Pierce filed a proof of claim in Vickie’s bankruptcy 
case, alleging that Vickie had defamed him by instructing her 
lawyers to tell reporters that Pierce had defrauded her out of 
her inheritance.124 In response, Vickie filed a counterclaim for 
tortious interference—a claim identical to her claim in the 
Texas probate court—alleging that Pierce had denied her the 
inheritance promised to her by the late J. Howard.125  
In September of 2000, the Bankruptcy Court entered a 
judgment in favor of Vickie on her counterclaim for tortious 
interference, and awarded her over $400 million in compensatory 
damages and $25 million in punitive damages.126 Pierce filed a 
posttrial motion under 28 U.S.C. § 157(d)127 in California district 
court, arguing that Vickie’s counterclaim, which was based on 
Texas common law, was not a “core proceeding” under 
§ 157(b)(2)(C)128 and that therefore the Bankruptcy Court lacked 
jurisdiction to adjudicate it.129 After several appeals, reversals, and 
a first trip to the Supreme Court in 2006, where a separate 
jurisdictional question was resolved,130 the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to resolve the question of “whether a bankruptcy court 
judge who did not enjoy [Article III] tenure and salary protections 
had the authority under 28 U.S.C. § 157 and Article III to enter 
final judgment on a counterclaim filed by Vickie . . . against 
Pierce . . . in Vickie’s bankruptcy proceedings.”131  
C. Analysis of Stern v. Marshall: Northern Pipeline 
Revisited and Resurrected  
In his opinion for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts 
ruled that although Vickie’s counterclaim qualified as “core,” 
and although the Bankruptcy Court had the statutory 
  
 124 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2601.  
 125 Id.  
 126 Id. Just several months later, in April of 2001, a Texas probate court held a 
jury trial on the dispute. This jury ruled in Pierce’s favor, finding that J. Howard’s will, 
which excluded Vickie, was valid. Marshall, 547 U.S. at 302.  
 127 See 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (2006) (“The district court may withdraw, in whole 
or in part, any case or proceeding referred under this section, on its own motion or on 
timely motion of any party, for cause shown.”).  
 128 Id. § 157(b)(2)(C). “Bankruptcy judges may hear and determine all cases 
under title 11 and all core proceedings arising under title 11 . . . .” Id. § 157(b)(1)-(2). 
See infra Part I.C.3 for an explanation of the “core” and “non-core” distinction that 
defines the scope of bankruptcy court jurisdiction.  
 129 See In re Marshall, 275 B.R. 5, 9 (C.D. Cal. 2002).  
 130 Marshall, 547 U.S. at 300, 301-05.  
 131 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2600.  
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authority to enter a final judgment on the claim,132 the 
structural safeguards of Article III precluded the Bankruptcy 
Court from exercising that authority. The Chief Justice cast 
the majority opinion in Stern in the same mold as Justice 
Brennan’s plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline. Northern 
Pipeline opened with an homage to Article III and a discussion of 
why its safeguards are vital to the independence of those who 
exercise the judicial power of the United States. Stern opened 
with the same overture.133 Moreover, in adopting Northern 
Pipeline’s holding that a bankruptcy court cannot constitutionally 
enter a final judgment on a state law contract claim that is not 
essential to the resolution of the bankruptcy, the Chief Justice 
wrote, “Substitute ‘tort’ for ‘contract,’ and that statement directly 
covers this case.”134 However, unlike Justice Brennan, who in 
Northern Pipeline invalidated the 1978 Act’s entire jurisdictional 
scheme, Chief Justice Roberts, quite significantly, emphasized 
that the holding in Stern is extremely narrow.135  
Although the majority opinion suggested that the ruling 
in Northern Pipeline predetermined the outcome of Stern, 
Justice Breyer, in his dissent, argued that the Court should 
have applied an alternative analysis.136 The dissent took issue 
with the Chief Justice’s decision to align Stern with the 
analysis in Northern Pipeline,137 arguing that the majority 
“overstates the importance of an analysis that did not command 
a Court majority in Northern Pipeline.”138 Consequently, 
according to the dissent, the majority opinion gave short shrift to 
the line of cases descending from Crowell that calls for a 
pragmatic interpretation of Article III—especially the Court’s 
most recent pronouncement in Schor, which, as Justice Breyer 
pointed out, did command a majority of the Court and 
therefore should represent the controlling precedent.139 In turn, 
Justice Breyer applied the balancing test from Schor—a more 
flexible and pragmatic standard—to the facts before the 
Court.140 Justice Breyer concluded that the bankruptcy court 
should have the authority to hear Vickie’s counterclaim 
  
 132 See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C).  
 133 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2600-01.  
 134 Id. at 2608-09. 
 135 Id. at 2620.  
 136 Id. at 2621-22 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 137 Id.  
 138 Id.  
 139 Id. at 2622, 2626.  
 140 Id. at 2626; see supra Part I.E.  
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because such power is necessary “to create an efficient, 
effective bankruptcy system.”141  
III. STERN SIGNIFIES A SEPARATE AND MORE FORMAL 
ARTICLE III ANALYSIS FOR BANKRUPTCY COURTS 
Until handing down the decision in Stern v. Marshall, 
the Supreme Court had remained silent on the 
constitutionality of the 1984 Amendments for nearly thirty 
years.142 Congress and the bankruptcy community knew that 
the 1984 Amendment “toe[d] the constitutional line.”143 In the 
aftermath of Thomas and Schor, during the great period of 
silence on the issue, as each Supreme Court session opened and 
closed without any development, Congress and the bankruptcy 
community gradually came to accept Northern Pipeline as a 
one-shot deal—an aberration in an otherwise complex and 
murky line of precedents whose only unifying characteristics 
were the Court’s pragmatism and deference to Congress.144  
The outcome in Stern v. Marshall did more than shatter 
this sense of complacency. It signified that Northern Pipeline is 
still good law, and it demonstrated that the Northern Pipeline 
approach stands independent of the balancing test adopted in 
Schor.145 The first wave of criticism of Stern argued that the 
Northern Pipeline approach has overtaken the Schor balancing 
test and now stands as the Court’s primary analytical 
framework for Article III.146 This note, however, argues that the 
Court appears to have adopted a bifurcated approach to 
determining the constitutionality of non-Article III 
  
 141 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2630.  
 142 See generally NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, supra note 61, at 732.  
 143 See Brubaker, supra note 4, at 1.  
 144 According to Professor Yackle, “In light of [Thomas] and Schor, everyone 
understands that the Court will rarely find reliance on non-Article III adjudicators 
invalid.” YACKLE, supra note 15, at 111.  
 145 In an article published prior to Stern, Professor McKenzie argues that the 
Court’s balancing test adopted in Schor is an ill fit for bankruptcy courts. McKenzie, 
supra note 78, at 754. Professor McKenzie’s instincts anticipated the ruling of Stern and 
support this note’s thesis that the Court has accepted that there is something different 
about bankruptcy courts that necessitates a special and stricter application of Article III.  
 146 See e.g., Ralph Brubaker, Article III’s Bleak House (Part II): The 
Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy Judges’ Core Jurisdiction, 31 BANKR. L. LETTER, 
No. 9, Sept. 2011, at 3. Even before Stern, scholars never considered that Northern 
Pipeline was a separate analytical framework applicable only to bankruptcy courts. For 
example, Professor Chemerinsky argued that Northern Pipeline should be overruled on 
the grounds that the Court has abandoned the plurality’s approach in Northern 
Pipeline by replacing it with the more pragmatic approach introduced in Thomas and 
later refined in Schor. Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Marathon: It Is Time to 
Overrule Northern Pipeline, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 311, 317-20 (1991).  
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adjudicators. Much of the confusion and criticism surrounding 
Northern Pipeline stemmed from the fact that it did not make 
sense in light of the Court’s other Article III jurisprudence.147 
But the development of the case law becomes much clearer 
upon understanding that the formal approach to Article III 
applied in Northern Pipeline reflects an analytical framework 
that is separate and distinct from the Schor balancing test, 
reserved exclusively for bankruptcy courts.148 For all non-Article 
III adjudicators that are not bankruptcy courts, the Court will 
continue to apply the Schor balancing test. When assessing the 
adjudicative power of bankruptcy courts, however, the Court 
will apply the more formal and literal understanding of Article 
III articulated in Northern Pipeline, which limits bankruptcy 
courts to entering final judgments on claims that are essential 
to the resolution of the bankruptcy.  
This section discusses the possible reasons why the 
Supreme Court applies a stricter Article III analysis to 
bankruptcy courts than to other non-Article III tribunals. It 
attributes the Court’s unique approach to bankruptcy court 
jurisdiction as a result of issues relating to due process, the 
Court’s efforts to reduce the size of the federal docket, a lack of 
a practical understanding of bankruptcy law by the Northern 
Pipeline plurality and Stern majority, and a long-standing 
rivalry between Article III and bankruptcy judges.  
A.  An Issue of Due Process  
Although the line of cases from Crowell through Stern 
has cast the question of whether a non-Article III tribunal has 
the constitutional authority to adjudicate certain claims as an 
Article III issue, the same question can be characterized as an 
issue of due process. Indeed, in his dissent in Crowell, Justice 
Brandeis argued that the Court did not face an Article III 
question but rather a question of due process.149 Whether the 
administrative court had the authority to adjudicate Knudsen’s 
Workers’ Compensation claim was entirely dependent on 
  
 147 McKenzie, supra note 78, at 770.  
 148 This is not the first instance of the Supreme Court applying a special 
analysis to bankruptcy courts. For example, although the Supreme Court has ruled 
that Congress cannot use any of its Article I powers to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity, see Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996), the Court has 
recently created a special exception to the general rule that allows Congress to use its 
Article I Bankruptcy Power to abrogate state sovereign immunity, see Cent. Va. Cmty. 
Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 359 (2006).  
 149 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 87-88 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
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whether the parties were afforded their constitutional right to 
due process, which Justice Brandeis described as a “requirement 
of judicial process.”150 Justice Brandeis’s suggestion that the 
question be viewed through the lens of due process reverberates 
through the line of cases descending from Crowell, offering an 
explanation for why the Court applies a more heightened and 
formal Article III inquiry in the case of bankruptcy courts than 
in the case of other non-Article III courts.151  
In Schor, Justice O’Connor seemingly relocated Justice 
Brandeis’s due process argument to Article III. Justice 
O’Connor noted that Article III protects not only “structural 
interests”—such as the integrity and independence of the 
judicial branch—but also “personal” interests, like the right to 
an impartial and independent adjudicator.152 To support this 
proposition, Justice O’Connor cited, among other sources, 
Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Crowell.153 Importantly, as Justice 
O’Connor explained in Schor and as Chief Justice Roberts 
pointed out in Stern,154 litigating parties may, in certain 
situations, waive their right to an Article III judge by consenting 
to the jurisdiction of non-Article III tribunals, without violating 
both Article III and the maxim that parties may never waive the 
requirement of subject-matter jurisdiction.155 The fact that the 
nondebtor defendants in Northern Pipeline and Stern could 
have consented to the subject-matter jurisdiction of the 
bankruptcy court reveals that, in bankruptcy cases, the Court 
is concerned with ensuring that the parties are afforded due 
process.156 In other words, if the parties themselves believe that 
  
 150 Id.  
 151 According to Professor Chemerinsky, “The Court properly has recognized 
that Article I courts are impermissible only when they are incompatible with due 
process or separation of powers.” Chemerinsky, supra note 146, at 311. 
 152 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986).  
 153 Id.  
 154 Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2607 (2011). This note argues that 
Stern has not affected the ability of litigants to consent under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) 
(2006). However, some commentators argue that Stern has invalidated the ability of 
parties to consent to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. See infra Part IV.B for a 
discussion of consent. 
 155 Schor, 478 U.S. at 849 (“Indeed, the relevance of concepts of waiver to Article 
III challenges is demonstrated by our decision in Northern Pipeline, in which the absence 
of consent to an initial adjudication before an Article III tribunal was relied on as a 
significant factor in determining that Article III forbade such adjudication.”).  
 156 Id. at 848. Nevertheless, there will be certain cases in which the structural 
interests at stake will surpass the personal interests of the parties, making waiver 
impossible. Justice O’Connor explains: “When these Article III limitations are at issue, 
notions of consent and waiver cannot be dispositive because the limitations serve 
institutional interests that the parties cannot be expected to protect.” Id. at 851. 
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the bankruptcy court provides them with adequate process—a 
fair opportunity to litigate their dispute before an impartial 
adjudicator—then their consent cures the Article III defects 
arising from the fact that bankruptcy judges lack life tenure 
and a guaranteed salary.  
The Court is appropriately more wary of potential due 
process violations before bankruptcy courts than before other 
non-Article III adjudicators. Compared to other non-Article III 
adjudicators, who also lack life tenure and a guaranteed salary, 
bankruptcy judges hear an incredibly wide variety of legal 
claims involving huge financial stakes and exercise 
extraordinary power with minimal oversight by district courts.157 
A district court reviews de novo any conclusions of law made by 
an administrative judge as well as any ruling on a dispositive 
motion made by a magistrate judge.158 In comparison, a district 
court reviews the decision of a bankruptcy court on “core 
claims” under the more deferential standard of “clearly 
erroneous” and reviews de novo only a bankruptcy court’s 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on “non-core-
but-related-to” claims.159 The reality, however, is that district 
courts relish the opportunity to pass bankruptcy work to 
bankruptcy courts and rarely distinguish between “core” and 
“non-core” when reviewing decisions by bankruptcy judges.160 
Whether a bankruptcy judge has submitted a final judgment on 
a core proceeding or submitted proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law on a “non-core-but-related-to” claim, district 
courts are quick to affirm with the same rubber stamp.161 
Perhaps buried in the subtext of Stern is a message from the 
Supreme Court to both Congress and the district courts to 
better supervise the activity of the bankruptcy courts.162 
  
 157 McKenzie, supra note 78, at 751.  
 158 See supra Part I.B.  
 159 See 28 U.S.C. § 158 (2006); id. § 157(c)(1). According to Professor 
McKenzie, “[A]ppellate review by Article III courts does not serve as an effective check 
on non-Article III judges in bankruptcy cases.” McKenzie, supra note 78, at 751. 
Indeed, Article III courts have very little interest in bankruptcy proceedings and tend 
not to vigorously review the appeals that work their way up the federal system. Id.  
 160 See Daniel J. Bussel, Power, Authority, and Precedent in Interpreting the 
Bankruptcy Code, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1068 n.28 (1994) (“As a practical matter, 
there may be precious little difference in how a given district judge reviews cases 
involving ‘recommendations’ in non-care matters and those involving ‘final judgments’ 
in core matters.”).  
 161 Id.  
 162 Perhaps the Court has let its Article III doctrine stay intentionally murky 
and ambiguous. In a blog post published several months before the Court handed down 
Stern, Professor McKenzie reflected on the forthcoming decision and suggested that 
“[a] little studied ambiguity keeps the system operating without letting matters get out 
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Compared to other non-Article III tribunals, bankruptcy 
courts have tremendous power to grant remedies without the 
aid of district courts.163 The agency court in Crowell, for example, 
was forced to rely on the district court to enforce any damages 
awarded in an administrative proceeding.164 Demonstrating the 
Court’s awareness of this distinction, Justice Brennan observed 
in Northern Pipeline that bankruptcy courts “exercise all 
ordinary powers of district courts, including the power to preside 
over jury trials, . . . the power to issue writs of habeas 
corpus, . . . and the power to issue any order, process, or 
judgment appropriate for the enforcement of the provisions of 
Title 11 . . . .”165 The Court is thus attuned to the fact that 
bankruptcy judges, who lack life tenure and salary protection, 
have the authority to grant extraordinary remedies both in law 
and equity. For that reason, the Court keeps bankruptcy courts 
on a shorter leash than it does other non-Article III tribunals 
by vigorously monitoring the boundaries of the bankruptcy 
court’s jurisdiction through the application of a more formal 
understanding of Article III.  
B. Reducing Litigation in the Federal Judicial System  
Another explanation for the Court’s more formal 
approach to Article III and its decision in Stern to narrow the 
scope of bankruptcy jurisdiction may be found in the modern 
Court’s antagonism toward litigation. Professor Siegel contends 
that the defining characteristic of the Rehnquist Court was its 
“palpable hostility to litigation.”166 A primary objective of the 
Rehnquist Court was to limit access to federal courtrooms by 
  
of hand.” Troy McKenzie, Anna Nicole Smith, Equity, and Article III, CREDIT SLIPS 
(Jan. 24, 2011, 4:08 PM), http//www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2011/01/anna-nicole-
smith-equity-and-artilce-iii.html.  
 163 Professor Samahon writes, “Bankruptcy judges are not mere judicial pawns, 
but the knights of the federal judicial hierarchy.” See Tuan Samahon, Are Bankruptcy 
Judges Unconstitutional? An Appointments Clause Challenge, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 233, 234 
(2008). Bankruptcy courts commonly oversee some of the largest and most significant 
business matters of the era. See, e.g., California v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp.), 05 
CIV. 4079 (GBD), 2005 WL 1185804 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2005) (Enron Corp. bankruptcy); 
In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., 08-13555 (JMP), 2008 WL 4902202 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 6, 2008) (Lehman Brothers bankruptcy).  
 164 See infra Part I.A.  
 165 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 86 (1982); 
see also 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006) (granting equity jurisdiction to the bankruptcy 
courts). See KENNETH N. KLEE, BANKRUPTCY AND THE SUPREME COURT 223-31 
(LexisNexis 2008).  
 166 Andrew M. Siegel, From Bad to Worse? Some Early Speculation About the 
Roberts Court and the Constitutional Fate of the Poor, 59 S.C. L. REV. 851, 861-62 (2008).  
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limiting the scope of federal remedies and federal rights of 
action, placing limitations on punitive damages, and making it 
more difficult for plaintiffs to collect attorney’s fees.167 Picking up 
where the Rehnquist Court left off, the Roberts Court has 
demonstrated an even more hostile attitude toward litigation.168 
The Roberts Court has taken aggressive action to trim the 
overtaxed and understaffed federal docket.169 With approximately 
1,410,653 bankruptcy filings170 and the commencement of 
289,969 civil actions171 at the district level in 2011, and with only 
179 circuit judges,172 677 district judges,173 and 350 bankruptcy 
judges174 to preside over these matters, the Chief Justice has 
legitimate concerns about reducing the volume of litigation 
filed in the federal judicial system. One obvious way to scale 
back the number of filings in federal courts is to reduce the 
  
 167 See generally Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to 
Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. 
REV. 1097 (2006).  
 168 Chief Justice Roberts’s judicial philosophy is grounded in the belief that 
the “federal judiciary has grown too expansive.” Andrew M. Siegel, Litigation Hostility in 
the Early Roberts Court, PRAWFSBLAWG (June 6, 2007), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/ 
prawfsblawg/2007/06/hostility_to_li.html. The Chief Justice’s hostile view toward 
litigation and efforts to restrict access to the federal judicial system is not without its 
critics. Professor Spencer argues that the Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662 (2009), restricts the ability of members of “societal out-groups” to bring claims 
against the dominant societal groups. A. Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide 
Toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185, 199-200 (2010). 
Furthermore, Professor Siegel describes litigation as “one of the most democratic 
institutions we have,” and, by restricting access to it, the Court has harmed the 
American democratic system. Siegel, supra note 166, at 862.  
 169 Notably, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, the Roberts Court abandoned a plaintiff-friendly pleading regime in favor of 
a heightened pleading standard that requires plaintiffs to plead their claims with greater 
specificity. Professor Siegel observes, “I have previously suggested that litigation hostility 
was the single most important theme of the Rehnquist era, but the theme certainly did 
not dominate the Rehnquist Court’s jurisprudence to the extent that it has dominated the 
[Roberts] Court’s thus far.” Siegel, supra note 166, at 861-62. Between 25 and 30% of the 
Rehnquist Court’s cases dealt with access to the federal court system while the 
percentage has dramatically risen under the Roberts Court. Id. Indeed, the 2006 
Supreme Court has become known as “the year [the Court] closed the courts.” Id. 
 170 The United States Courts website tracks the judicial business of Article III and 
bankruptcy courts. See Judicial Caseload Indicators, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary/2011/Dec-
11/Dec11Indicators.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2013).  
 171 Id.  
 172 The United States Courts website also provides statistics about the 
number of Article III judges in service. See Federal Judgeships, U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/FederalJudgeships.aspx (last visited 
Jan. 20, 2013). 
 173 Id.  
 174 The Federal Judicial Center website provides statistics about the number 
of bankruptcy judges in service. See History of the Federal Judiciary, FED. JUD. CTR., 
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges_bank.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2013).  
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jurisdictional scope of federal tribunals—the approach utilized 
in Stern. Whether the elimination of counterclaims from the 
bankruptcy court’s core jurisdiction will reduce the workload of 
bankruptcy and district courts remains to be seen.175 In any 
event, the ruling in Stern makes litigating state law claims 
that are not closely related to the ongoing bankruptcy 
considerably more burdensome for all parties.176  
Lurking in the background of the majority opinion in 
Stern are federalism issues that overlap with the Court’s 
hostility toward federal litigation. The Chief Justice suggested 
that a bankruptcy court in California had no business 
adjudicating Vickie’s state law counterclaim, which was only 
tangentially related to her bankruptcy filing, especially in light 
of the fact that the same claim was simultaneously being 
litigated in a Texas probate court.177 Given his goal of 
preserving judicial resources and reducing the volume of 
federal litigation, the Chief Justice was likely quite frustrated 
with this duplication of judicial effort. The Chief Justice 
concluded that Vickie’s state law claim should be resolved by 
an expert on such claims—a state court in Texas.178  
C. The Stern Majority Lacks a Practical Understanding of 
Bankruptcy Law  
Another possible explanation for the Supreme Court’s 
distinctive approach to bankruptcy court jurisdiction is that the 
Justices forming the majority in Stern and the plurality in 
Northern Pipeline lacked a working knowledge of the 
bankruptcy process. As a result, they view a powerful 
bankruptcy court with jurisdiction over state claims as a threat 
to the integrity of Article III, not as a necessity to the effective 
and efficient resolution of bankruptcy proceedings.179 In his 
  
 175 See infra Part IV.A for a discussion of how bankruptcy and district courts 
are treating certain state law claims post-Stern. 
 176 See infra Part IV.A. 
 177 Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2599, 2619-20 (2011). As a nod to 
principles of Federalism, the Chief Justice cites to the United States Code. See id. at 
2619-20. “Section 1334(c)(2) . . . requires that bankruptcy courts abstain from hearing 
specified non-core, state claims that ‘can be timely adjudicated[] in a State forum of 
appropriate jurisdiction.’” Id. (emphasis added). 
 178 Id. at 2619-20. “Section 1334(c)(1) . . . provides that bankruptcy courts may 
abstain from hearing any proceeding, including core matters, ‘in the interest of comity 
with State courts or respect for State law.’” Id. at 2620. 
 179 The members of the Supreme Court are aware that, after years of service 
on the Court, their practical understanding of legal practice on the ground in 
courtrooms across the country may be outdated. In a profound moment of candor in 
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study of the history of the Supreme Court’s bankruptcy 
jurisprudence, Professor Klee observes that, “Because Justices 
at a particular time may be unfamiliar with bankruptcy law, 
the Court may render a decision that causes more problems 
than it resolves.”180 That might explain why the majority 
opinion in Stern dismissed the possibility of any practical 
consequences of narrowing the scope of bankruptcy 
jurisdiction, while the dissent vehemently disagreed with the 
majority’s operating assumption.181 Four of the five Justices in 
the majority—Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Scalia, 
and Thomas—are new textualists, who resolve bankruptcy 
questions by focusing on the plain meaning of the Constitution 
and statutory provisions in question.182 On the other hand, the 
author of the dissent, Justice Breyer—a notable scholar of 
administrative law183—examines bankruptcy questions from a 
less theoretical perspective and pragmatically “looks to the 
purpose the statute addresses as a point of first inquiry.”184 
Whereas the new textualists of the majority were concerned 
with weighty separation-of-powers issues and protecting 
Article III from even “slight encroachment[]” by Congress and 
the bankruptcy courts,185 the author of the dissent, who has had 
substantial exposure to the nuances of bankruptcy practice, is 
concerned with providing debtors and creditors with “an efficient, 
effective federal bankruptcy system.”186 Similarly, in his dissent in 
  
questioning his decision to dissent to the 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Justice Scalia reflected,  
Justice Douglas, who in earlier years on the Court had been wont to note his 
disagreements with proposed changes [to the Federal Rules], generally 
abstained from doing so later on, acknowledging that his expertise had grown 
stale. Never having specialized in trial practice, I began at the level of 
expertise (and of acquiescence in others’ proposals) with which Justice 
Douglas ended.  
146 F.R.D. 401, 513.  
 180 KLEE, supra note 165, at 5. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the 
potential implications of Stern.  
 181 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620.  
 182 See KLEE, supra note 165, at 14 n.47.  
 183 See generally, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY 
POLICY (1992). 
 184 See KLEE, supra note 165, at 14 n.47. 
 185 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620.  
 186 Id. at 2629 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer offers a hypothetical 
based on an actual bankruptcy case in which a tenant, who had previously filed for 
bankruptcy, brings a counterclaim against a creditor—her landlord—for committing 
several housing violations under state law. As a result of Stern, those claims would 
have to be brought in state court, delaying the debtor-tenant’s access to relief and 
making the relief more costly. Id. at 2629-30. 
1018 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:3 
Northern Pipeline, Justice White criticized the plurality for 
failing to comprehend that “the bankruptcy judge is constantly 
enmeshed in state-law issues.”187 Justice White lambasted the 
plurality for deciding the case on the “intricacies of the 
separation-of-powers doctrine” when “abstract theory . . . has 
little to do with the reality of bankruptcy proceedings.”188  
D. Stern Reflects a Longstanding Antipathy of Article III 
Judges Toward Bankruptcy Courts 
A more controversial explanation for the Supreme 
Court’s decision to twice reign in the adjudicative authority of 
bankruptcy courts harks back to the long-standing turf war 
between Article III judges and bankruptcy judges.189 As noted 
earlier, the judicial officers who are now known as bankruptcy 
judges were formerly known as bankruptcy referees.190 In 1973, 
however, as bankruptcy law became a more prominent practice 
area, the Supreme Court promulgated the new Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure, which conferred the title “bankruptcy 
judges” on those erstwhile referees.191 Although in certain 
federal districts the new bankruptcy judges were permitted by 
their Article III counterparts to wear black robes, most federal 
districts prohibited bankruptcy judges from riding in the 
Article III judges’ elevators, parking in the Article III judges’ 
spaces, and eating in the dining rooms reserved for Article III 
judges.192 This antipathy of Article III judges toward 
bankruptcy judges reportedly stems from the fact that 
bankruptcy judges preside over a multitude of issues that are 
the traditional business of Article III judges, who viewed 
  
 187 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 96-99 (1982) 
(White, J., dissenting). Fittingly, before serving on the Supreme Court, Justice White 
was a prominent corporate attorney who “developed [a] specialized knowledge of 
bankruptcy [law]” while “negotiating real estate deals . . . [and] structuring financial 
mechanisms for various commercial transactions.” DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN 
WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE: A PORTRAIT OF JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 227 (1998). 
 188 N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 96-99 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).  
 189 See Dan Schecter, Statutory Power of Bankruptcy Courts to Hear and 
Determine Compulsory State-Law Counterclaims Against Non-Bankrupt Claimants Is 
Unconstitutional, 2011 COMM. FIN. NEWSL. 51 (2011).  
 190 Countryman, supra note 46, at 22.  
 191 Id.  
 192 Id. Reflecting on his experience as a judicial law clerk twenty-two years 
ago, Professor Lawless recalls that the bankruptcy judges in his district were not 
allowed to ride in elevators reserved for “regular federal judges.” Bob Lawless, Anna 
Nicole Smith May Be More Than Just the Only Loser on This One, CREDIT SLIPS (Jan. 
23, 2011, 4:33 PM), http//www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2011/06/anna-nicole-smith-
may-be-more-than-just-the-only-loser-on-this-one.html.  
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widening the scope of bankruptcy jurisdiction as an 
encroachment of their exclusive domain.193 
The tense relationship between Article III judges and 
bankruptcy judges hit fever pitch during the congressional 
hearings held in the run up to the passage of the 1978 Act.194 As 
Congress contemplated expanding the scope of bankruptcy 
jurisdiction, Congress wrestled with the related issue of 
whether to grant bankruptcy judges Article III status.195 Both 
the bankruptcy bar and bankruptcy judges favored the move to 
Article III status, viewing it as a way to elevate the status of 
the bankruptcy profession, which was perceived as a second-
tier practice area until the restructuring boom of the 1980s and 
1990s. The most vocal critics of the change in status of 
bankruptcy judges were Article III judges, who were 
antagonistic to bankruptcy practice and believed that 
bestowing Article III status on bankruptcy judges would 
diminish the prestige of Article III judges.196 During a 
congressional hearing, for instance, when asked by the counsel 
to the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery 
whether bankruptcy judges should have law clerks to assist 
them with their work, District Judge Wesley E. Brown 
responded, “I do not think they need a law clerk. That is why 
they were appointed in the first place . . . .”197  
At another hearing on the issue, Judge Simon H. 
Rifkind referred to bankruptcy judges as “assistants to [Article 
III] judges.” Moreover, Judge Rifkind testified, “A significant 
increase in the number of Article III judges as is contemplated 
by the proposed law would, in my opinion, dilute the prestige of 
district judges,” which would make it more difficult to lure the 
most qualified and talented lawyers away from private practice 
to serve on the federal bench.198  
  
 193 Id.  
 194 See generally DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY 
LAW IN AMERICA 141-83 (2001). See supra Part I.C for a discussion of the 1978 Act.  
 195 SKEEL, supra note 194, at 157.  
 196 Id. at 157-58.  
 197 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary United States 
Senate, 95th Cong. 429 (1977) (statement of Judge Wesley E. Brown, U.S. District 
Court, Wichita, Kansas).  
 198 Bankruptcy Court Revision: Hearings on H.R. 8200, Before the Subcomm. 
on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1977) (statement of Hon. Simon H. Rifkind, Immediate Past President, American 
College of Trial Lawyers).  
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The result was that Congress voted to grant broad 
jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts without officially granting 
them Article III status.199 The jurisdictional grant of the 1978 
Act represented a compromise—an attempt to placate both the 
bankruptcy community and the Article III judges. 
The climax of the dispute occurred when Chief Justice 
Warren Burger actively lobbied President Carter to not sign 
the 1978 Act.200 This intervention of the Chief Justice into the 
legislative process was unprecedented. Chief Justice Burger 
shared the same fears as his colleagues on the district courts 
that the appointment of “inferior” bankruptcy judges would 
dilute the prestige and talent of Article III courts.201 According 
to Professor Skeel, during the debate, Chief Justice Burger 
quite tellingly asked a legal scholar, “Would you accept a 
bankruptcy judgeship?”202 Ultimately, President Carter did sign 
the 1978 Act into law despite such opposition. However, the 
Supreme Court would have the final word on the debate a few 
years later, when it ruled in Northern Pipeline that the broad 
jurisdictional grant was unconstitutional.203  
Although the Court’s composition has changed since 
then, the majority opinion in Stern appears to embody the 
same antipathy toward bankruptcy judges, and it is just as 
protective of the Article III domain as its predecessor. In the 
closing paragraphs of Stern, perhaps referencing bankruptcy 
judges and the bankruptcy bar, Chief Justice Roberts observed, 
“Slight encroachments create new boundaries from which 
legions of power can seek new territory to capture.”204  
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF STERN V. MARSHALL ON THE 
FUTURE OF BANKRUPTCY COURTS’ AUTHORITY 
Stern has already elicited a frenetic response in 
courtrooms and among the legal academy. As of February 16, 
2013, a little over a year and a half after the Supreme Court 
handed down Stern v. Marshall, the case had been cited by 705 
  
 199 SKEEL, supra note 194, at 158.  
 200 Id.  
 201 Id.  
 202 Id. (emphasis added). 
 203 See supra Part I.C.  
 204 Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011) (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 
U.S. 1, 39 (1957)).  
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courts nationwide and by 571 scholarly sources.205 In an 
epigraph to his opinion, the Chief Justice likened the procedural 
history of Stern to the litigation in the novel Bleak House, about 
which Charles Dickens wrote, “This suit has, in course of time, 
become so complicated, that . . . no two . . . lawyers can talk 
about it for five minutes, without coming to a total disagreement 
as to all the premises.”206 The same thing might be said about 
Stern’s aftermath. In a recent article, one commentator astutely 
noted, “The issues surrounding Stern seem to be proliferating on 
a weekly basis and cannot all be addressed here.”207 For that 
reason, this section will focus only on two issues that have 
already caused a flurry of speculation among commentators. 
This section will first discuss Stern’s effect on bankruptcy courts’ 
ability to enter final judgments on fraudulent conveyance 
claims. Finally, this section will discuss Stern’s impact on the 
ability of parties to consent to the bankruptcy courts’ authority 
to enter a final judgment on “non-core-related-to” matters that 
are not necessary to the resolution of the bankruptcy. This 
section argues that Stern’s holding should be applied narrowly, 
and that the case should have no impact on the bankruptcy 
court’s authority to hear fraudulent conveyance claims nor on a 
litigant’s ability to consent to bankruptcy court jurisdiction.  
A. Stern Does Not Preclude a Bankruptcy Court from Entering 
a Final Judgment on a Fraudulent Conveyance Claim  
One immediate consequence of Stern has been 
speculation as to whether bankruptcy courts have the 
authority to enter final judgments on fraudulent conveyance 
claims. Although the Bankruptcy Code contains a fraudulent 
transfer provision,208 such claims have their origin in early-
  
 205 According to the KeyCite tool on Westlaw.com, Stern v. Marshall has been 
cited by 25 Circuit Court of Appeals, 201 district courts, 472 bankruptcy courts, and 6 
state courts (as of Feb. 16, 2013). 
 206 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2600 (citing CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE, in 1 
WORKS OF CHARLES DICKENS 4-5 (1891)). Compare Schecter, supra note 189 (arguing 
that Stern will not be a “game-changer”), with HON. NANCY C. DREHER, BANKRUPTCY 
LAW MANUAL § 2:12 n.10 (arguing that Stern’s impact will be broad).  
 207 Frank Volk, First Impressions: Interpreting Stern, 30-JAN AM. BANKR. INST. J., 
22 (2011). In a section on its bankruptcy blog appropriately titled “The Stern Files,” the law 
firm Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP monitors and analyzes Stern’s impact on noteworthy 
bankruptcy cases. See Kyle Ortiz, The Stern Files, WEIL BANKR. BLOG (Aug. 23, 2011), 
http://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com/category/stern-files/#axzz2ILR4w800.  
 208 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2006).  
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seventeenth-century English common law.209 According to 28 
U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(H), “proceedings to determine, avoid, or 
recover fraudulent conveyances” are “core” claims.210 As 
discussed earlier, if a claim is “core,” a bankruptcy court may 
hear it and enter a final judgment on the claim.211 Post-Stern, 
litigants have argued that fraudulent conveyance claims so 
closely resemble Vickie’s counterclaim that the same logic 
should apply, prohibiting bankruptcy courts from entering a 
final judgment on them.212 If that were the case, bankruptcy 
courts would only be able to issue proposed findings of facts 
and conclusions of law that would be reviewed de novo by the 
district court.213 On the other hand, others argue that even if 
the Supreme Court’s separate, stricter analytical approach to 
Article III for bankruptcy courts is applied, bankruptcy courts 
will likely retain the authority to enter final judgments on 
fraudulent conveyance claims.  
As Bankruptcy Judge Robert D. Drain of the Southern 
District of New York observed in a recent opinion, “Reasonable 
people may differ over whether Stern’s prohibition on the 
bankruptcy court’s issuance of a final judgment extends to 
fraudulent transfer claims.”214 Indeed, as federal district and 
bankruptcy court judges attempt to make sense of Stern’s 
impact on this issue, they are slowly dividing into two opposing 
camps. The first camp favors a broad reading of Stern that 
prohibits bankruptcy courts from entering final judgments on 
fraudulent conveyance claims.215 By contrast, the second camp 
argues that Stern must be read narrowly and that the 
authority of bankruptcy courts to enter final judgments on such 
claims remains unchanged.216  
  
 209 Fraudulent conveyance claims trace their origin back to the Star Chamber 
in England. See Twyne’s Case, 3 Coke, 80 (1601).  
 210 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(H) (2006). 
 211 Id. Congress has created a federal right of action for the trustee in bankruptcy 
to pursue the recovery and avoidance of fraudulent transfers. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2006). 
 212 See e.g., Picard v. Flinn Invs., LLC, 463 B.R. 280, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 213 See supra Part I.C.3.  
 214 Kirschner v. Agoglia (In re Refco Inc.), 461 B.R. 181, 186 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 215 See e.g., Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. 
Agency, Inc.), No. 11-35162, 2012 WL 6013836, at *2-10 (9th Cir. Dec. 4, 2012); 
Waldman v. Stone, 698 F.3d 910, 919 (6th Cir. 2012); Kirschner v. Agoglia, 476 B.R. 75, 
79-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Stettin v. Regent Capital Partners, LLC (In re Rothstein, 
Rosenfeldt, Adler, P.A.), No. 11-62612-CIV, 2012 WL 882497, at *3-4 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 
14, 2012); Heller Ehrman LLP v. Arnold & Porter, LLP (In re Heller Ehrman LLP), 464 
B.R. 348, 352-54 (N.D. Cal. 2011).  
 216 See e.g., KHI Liquidation Trust v. Wisenbaker Builder Servs., Inc. (In re 
Kimball Hill, Inc.), 480 B.R. 894, 899-904 (N.D. Ill. 2012); Feuerbacher v. Moser, No. 
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In In re Heller Ehrmann LLP, Judge Charles R. Breyer 
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California 
ruled that Stern prevents a bankruptcy court from entering a 
final judgment on a fraudulent conveyance claim.217 Judge 
Breyer was not persuaded by the debtor’s argument that Stern 
applies narrowly and only to counterclaims such as Vickie’s.218 
Nor was he persuaded by the argument that fraudulent 
conveyance claims are necessary for the complete resolution of 
a bankruptcy proceeding.219 Instead, Judge Breyer relied on the 
plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline, which limited 
Congress’s authority to create non-Article III adjudicative 
bodies to three specific exceptions,220 including territorial courts, 
military courts, and the adjudication of public rights.221 Because 
the adjudication of a fraudulent conveyance claim does not fall 
within any of the three exceptions, Judge Breyer reasoned that 
the bankruptcy court lacked authority to enter a final 
judgment on the claim.222  
On the opposite coast, Judge Drain ruled that Stern’s 
holding does not prohibit bankruptcy courts from entering a 
final judgment on fraudulent conveyance claims.223 Unlike Judge 
Breyer, Judge Drain placed great significance on Chief Justice 
Roberts’s declaration that Stern should be read narrowly.224 
Although the adjudication of a fraudulent conveyance claim does 
not fall within one of the three exceptions specified by the 
Northern Pipeline plurality, Judge Drain observed, citing Justice 
Scalia’s concurrence, that “there are at least seven different 
reasons given in the [Stern] Court’s opinion for concluding that 
an Article III judge was required to adjudicate [Vickie’s] 
  
4:11-CV-272, 2012 WL 1070138, at *5-9 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2012); Bohm v. Titus (In re 
Titus), 467 B.R. 592, 633-34 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2012); In re Refco Inc., 461 B.R. at 183-94.  
 217 In re Heller Ehrman LLP, 464 B.R. at 350, 352-54. 
 218 Id. at 352.  
 219 Id. at 353.  
 220 Id. at 353-54. See supra Part I.C for a discussion of Northern Pipeline.  
 221 In Granfinanciera S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 31 (1989), the Supreme Court 
ruled that a bankruptcy trustee’s right to bring a fraudulent conveyance claim was a 
private right, not a public right. Id. at 34. The Court explained that a “public right” 
included “but [was] not limited to a matter arising between the Government and 
others,” which also “extends to a seemingly ‘private’ right that is closely intertwined 
with a federal regulatory program that Congress has power to enact.” Id.  
 222 In re Heller Ehrman LLP, 464 B.R. at 354. In In re Bellingham, the Ninth 
Circuit adopted Judge Breyer’s reasoning and reached the same conclusion that 
bankruptcy courts lack the authority to enter final judgments on fraudulent 
conveyance claims. Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. 
Agency, Inc.), No. 11-35162, 2012 WL 6013836, at *2-10 (9th Cir. Dec. 4, 2012). 
 223 Kirschner v. Agoglia (In re Refco Inc.), 461 B.R. 181, 185 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 224 Id. at 191.  
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lawsuit.”225 Judge Drain placed less significance on the Northern 
Pipeline plurality opinion and instead located the authority for 
bankruptcy courts to enter final judgments on fraudulence 
conveyance claims in two places.226  
First, although fraudulent conveyance claims were 
originally creatures of common law, Congress created a federal 
right of action to pursue such claims in bankruptcy courts.227 This 
is significant because Northern Pipeline and Stern dealt with 
claims that were derived exclusively from state common law. This 
means that a fraudulent conveyance claim brought in a 
bankruptcy court under federal law more closely resembles the 
federal claims brought in Crowell, Thomas, and Schor than the 
state common law claims brought in Northern Pipeline and Stern. 
Citing Stern, Judge Drain pointed out that “[u]nlike the state law 
tortious interference claim in Stern, the Trustee’s fraudulent 
transfer claim here ‘flow[s] from a federal statutory scheme’” and 
is “completely dependent upon adjudication of a claim created 
by federal law.”228 Thus, because a bankruptcy court—a court 
created by Congress—is adjudicating a congressionally created 
right of action, the constitutional concerns that arose in 
Northern Pipeline and in Stern are likely not in play. 
Second, Judge Drain found support in Justice Scalia’s 
concurrence in Stern that “Article III judges are required in all 
federal adjudications, unless there is a firmly established 
historical practice to the contrary.”229 Fraudulent transfer claims 
have played a critical role in the resolution of bankruptcy cases 
since the 18th century.230 If the question were ever to reach the 
Supreme Court, Justice Scalia could provide the swing-vote in 
what might be another 5-4 decision permitting bankruptcy 
courts to enter final judgments on fraudulent conveyance claims 
because of established historical practice.  
Judge Drain’s narrow reading of Stern, which retains 
the “core” status of fraudulent conveyance claims, is preferable 
to Judge Breyer’s broader reading for several reasons. First, 
Chief Justice Roberts repeatedly emphasized that the holding 
  
 225 Id. at 186-87 (citing Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2621 (2011) (Scalia, 
J., concurring)).  
 226 Id. at 187.  
 227 Id.; see e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2006).  
 228 In re Refco Inc., 461 B.R. at 187 (citing Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 
2614 (2011)).  
 229 Id. at 186-87 (citing Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2621 (2011) (Scalia, 
J., concurring)).  
 230 Id. at 187. 
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of Stern is narrow. In contrast, in Northern Pipeline, the 
Supreme Court was quite clear about its intention to invalidate 
the bankruptcy court regime in its entirety.231 Had the Court 
meant to achieve that result again, it would not have repeatedly 
emphasized the narrowness of its ruling. Furthermore, 
fraudulent conveyance claims are an integral part of most 
bankruptcy cases. As Judge Drain explained, “Such claims 
often play a prominent role in bankruptcy cases, either because 
of their sheer numbers or because of the effect that the 
potential avoidance of a transfer, lien, or obligation may have 
on creditors’ recoveries.”232 
Unlike Vickie’s counterclaim, which was tangentially 
related to her bankruptcy case, fraudulent conveyance claims 
play a central role in the restructuring of debtor-creditor 
relations. This is especially true in modern business 
bankruptcy cases involving transfers of large amounts of 
money to third parties—for example, in cases involving Ponzi 
schemes and other frauds.233 If fraudulent conveyance claims 
are no longer “core” and the bankruptcy court cannot enter a 
final judgment, litigants will have more opportunities to 
engage in gamesmanship.234 The defendant in a fraudulent 
conveyance action could, for example, begin litigating the claim 
in bankruptcy court. However, if the proceeding appeared to be 
going in the plaintiff’s favor, the defendant could seek to have 
the claim removed to a potentially more favorable forum. Also, 
litigation in the bankruptcy court moves at a quicker pace than 
in the district court. This could incentivize deep-pocketed 
defendants to remove fraudulent conveyance claims to district 
courts or state courts in order to prolong the litigation and 
deter cash-strapped debtors from pursuing claims. Eliminating 
fraudulent conveyance claims from the core jurisdiction of 
bankruptcy courts would encourage a “constitutionally 
required game of jurisdictional ping-pong between courts [that] 
would lead to inefficiency, increased cost, delay, and needless 
additional suffering among those faced with bankruptcy.”235  
  
 231 See supra Part I.C.2.  
 232 In re Refco Inc., 461 B.R. at 188.  
 233 Id. 
 234 See Adam Lewis et al., Stern v. Marshall: A Jurisdictional Game Changer?, 
J. BANKR. L. 2011.09-8 (2011).  
 235 Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2630 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
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B. Stern Likely Will Not Affect Consent  
In the aftermath of Stern, the bankruptcy community is 
also pondering whether litigants can still consent to 
bankruptcy courts’ authority to enter a final judgment on “non-
core-related-to” matters that are not necessary to the resolution 
of the bankruptcy.236 In other words, could Pierce have consented 
to having a bankruptcy judge enter a final judgment on Vickie’s 
counterclaim? In Schor, Justice O’Connor framed Article III as 
not only a protector of broad “structural interests” but also as a 
protector of “personal interests.”237 In certain instances, when the 
structural interests in play are de minimis, parties may waive 
their right to an Article III adjudicator and permit, for 
example, a bankruptcy court to enter a final judgment on a 
claim.238 Post-Stern, the issue becomes whether the Article III 
structural interests that compelled the result in Stern are of 
such magnitude that even the consent of both litigants could 
not cure the constitutional defects that troubled the Chief 
Justice and other Justices in the majority.  
The majority opinion does not expressly decide whether 
parties may consent to bankruptcy court jurisdiction. In fact, 
Stern contains conflicting statements that have caused 
confusion among bankruptcy commentators.239 In one passage, 
Chief Justice Roberts stated, “The ‘experts’ in the federal 
system at resolving common law counterclaims such as Vickie’s 
are the Article III courts, and it is with those courts that her 
claim must stay.”240 Reading this sentence in isolation would 
seem to suggest that the majority no longer considers consent 
an option because of the broader separation of powers issues. 
In the very next paragraph, however, Chief Justice Roberts 
appears to suggest that consent to jurisdiction is still possible. 
The Chief Justice stated that Stern’s holding was reached 
simply by substituting the word “tort” for “contract” into the 
holding of Northern Pipeline, which “establish[ed] only that 
  
 236 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) (2006). See e.g., Professor Kenneth N. Klee on Stern v. 
Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 180 L. Ed. 2d 475, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4791 (2011), 2011 
EMERGING ISSUES 5743; Richard Lieb, The Supreme Court, in Stern v. Marshall, by 
Applying Article III of the Constitution Further Limited the Statutory Authority of 
Bankruptcy Courts to Issue Final Orders, 20 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC., no. 4 (Sept. 2011).  
 237 See supra Part III.A.  
 238 See supra Part III.A.  
 239 Compare Schecter, supra note 189 (arguing that consent is still valid), with 
Peter C. Blain, Bankruptcy 2011: A Brave New World, ASPATORE, 2011 WL 6471010 
(Dec. 2011) (arguing that Stern suggests that consent is no longer an option).  
 240 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2615.  
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Congress may not vest in a non-Article III court the power to 
adjudicate, render final judgment and issue binding orders in a 
traditional contract action arising under state law, without 
consent of the litigants, and subject only to ordinary appellate 
review.”241 Thus, on its face, the majority opinion is internally 
inconsistent with respect to its treatment of consent.  
The majority’s contradictory statements regarding 
consent have created the first Stern circuit split.242 In In re 
Bellingham, the Ninth Circuit recently held that Stern does not 
affect a litigant’s ability to waive his right to have a non-core 
claim adjudicated by an Article III court and to consent to have 
the claim adjudicated by a bankruptcy court.243 However, in 
Waldman v. Stone, the Sixth Circuit ruled that a litigant’s 
right to Article III adjudication of a non-core claim was not 
waivable.244 This split has arisen as a result of the Sixth and 
Ninth Circuits’ different interpretations of Schor. In Schor, the 
Court explained that Article III protects “structural interests,” 
such as the integrity and independence of the judicial branch, 
while also protecting “personal interests” like the right to an 
impartial and independent adjudicator.245 Although litigants 
may never waive rights relating to structural interests, 
litigants can waive rights relating to personal interests.246 The 
Sixth Circuit characterized the right to an Article III 
adjudication of a non-core claim as a “nonwaivable structural 
principle.”247 Citing Schor, the Sixth Circuit described consent 
as a way for Congress to shift the judicial power of the United 
States to judges who lack the protections of Article III, “for the 
purpose of emasculating constitutional courts.”248 On the other 
hand, while also quoting Schor, the Ninth Circuit characterized 
a litigant’s right to an Article III adjudication as personal and 
thus “subject to waiver.”249  
  
 241 Id. (emphasis added). 
 242 Kyle J. Ortiz & Doron Kenter, Stern Files: The Circuit that Originally 
Gave Us Stern Creates the First Stern Circuit Split, WEIL BANKR. BLOG (Dec. 6, 2012), 
http://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com/jurisdiction/stern-files-the-circuit-that-
originally-gave-us-stern-creates-the-first-stern-circuit-split/#axzz2ILR4w800.  
 243 Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, 
Inc.), No. 11-35162, 2012 WL 6013836, at *11 (9th Cir. Dec. 4, 2012).  
 244 Waldman v. Stone, 698 F.3d 910, 917-18 (6th Cir. 2012).  
 245 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986).  
 246 Id.  
 247 Waldman, 698 F.3d at 917.  
 248 Id. at 918 (quoting Schor, 478 U.S. at 850).  
 249 Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, 
Inc.), No. 11-35162, 2012 WL 6013836, at *11 (9th Cir. Dec. 4, 2012) (quoting Schor, 478 
U.S. at 848).  
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Despite the Sixth Circuit’s ruling, consent under 28 
U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) is likely to remain permissible for two 
reasons. First, Justice Scalia, in his concurrence, suggested 
that non-Article III courts should only be permitted to 
adjudicate Article III claims if there is historical precedent for 
doing so.250 In Waldman, the Sixth Circuit failed to acknowledge 
the long line of historical precedent that permits litigants to 
consent to bankruptcy court jurisdiction. According to a 1945 
note in the Yale Law Journal, “although claimants to property 
involved in bankruptcy proceedings are ordinarily entitled to 
plenary suit in a state or federal forum in accordance with 
Section 23 of the [1898 Act], their rights may be adjudicated [in 
the bankruptcy court] . . . when [both litigants] consent.”251 
Plenary suits under the 1898 Act can be thought of as 
analogous to “non-core-but-related-to” claims. Furthermore, a 
line of Supreme Court cases dating back to 1902 affirmed 
parties’ ability to consent to jurisdiction under the 1898 Act.252 
In Macdonald v. Plymouth County Trust Co., the Court held, 
“We can perceive no reason why the privilege of claiming the 
benefits of the procedure in a plenary suit . . . may not be 
waived by consent, as any other procedural privilege of the 
suitor may be waived, and a more summary procedure 
substituted.”253 Considering the long-standing tradition of 
permitting consent in cases filed under the 1898 Act and the 
Supreme Court’s recurring approval of consent throughout the 
first part of the twentieth century, the modern Court is likely 
to leave the ability of parties to consent to bankruptcy court 
jurisdiction undisturbed.  
Second, a determination of consent as unconstitutional 
could have far-reaching consequences that extend beyond the 
arena of bankruptcy courts. The Committee on Courts and the 
Administrative System of the National Bankruptcy Conference 
suggests that if consent under § 157(c)(2) were ruled 
unconstitutional, then the provision under the Federal 
Magistrate Act that permits litigants to consent to the 
adjudication of claims by magistrate judges would, by analogy, 
  
 250 Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2621 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 251 Note, Implied Consent to Summary Jurisdiction in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 
54 YALE L.J. 461 (1945) [hereinafter Implied Consent]. 
 252 Id. at 461 n.5. See, e.g., Macdonald v. Plymouth Cnty. Trust Co., 286 U.S. 
263 (1932); Harrison v. Chamberlin, 271 U.S. 191 (1926); Galbraith v. Vallely, 256 U.S. 
46 (1921); Louisville Trust Co. v. Leonard Comingor, 184 U.S. 18 (1902).  
 253 Macdonald, 286 U.S. at 267.  
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also be unconstitutional.254 According to the bankruptcy counsel 
for the National Association of Attorneys General, the consent 
provisions for both magistrate and bankruptcy courts “will rise 
and fall together.”255 Perhaps in an attempt to resolve any 
confusion surrounding this issue and keep the federal docket 
moving efficiently, the Fifth Circuit raised, sua sponte, the 
question of whether Stern affected litigants’ ability to consent 
to magistrate judges’ authority to enter a final judgment on 
state law counterclaims.256 The Fifth Circuit interpreted Stern’s 
holding narrowly and held that magistrates did in fact 
maintain such authority.257  
Jurisdiction by consent in both the context of 
bankruptcy courts and magistrate courts makes litigation more 
efficient and less costly for litigants, and it also lightens the 
already bulging docket of the district courts. If consent were 
found unconstitutional, it could have profound consequences on 
the efficiency of the federal judicial system. The Supreme Court 
likely will refrain from disturbing an area of law that lower 
courts and litigants have come to rely on so profoundly.258  
CONCLUSION: THE WAITING RESUMES 
Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Northern 
Pipeline, in which the Court invalidated the entire 
jurisdictional grant to bankruptcy courts in one fell swoop, 
Congress passed the 1984 Amendments to narrow the 
jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts in an attempt to cure the 
constitutional infirmities that prompted the Court to act. Now, 
post-Stern, the question is what should Congress do? In theory, 
  
 254 See Comm. on Courts & the Admin. Sys., The Scope and Implications of 
Stern v. Marshall 131 S. Ct. (2011), NAT’L BANKR. CONF., Oct. 26, 2011, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1979503. Under the Federal Magistrate Act, with the consent 
of the parties, magistrate judges “conduct any or all proceedings in a jury trial or 
nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) 
(2006). See supra Part I.B for a discussion of the constitutionality of magistrates.  
 255 Karen Cordry, Bankruptcy: Not So Special Anymore, 30-JAN AM. BANKR. 
INST. J. 12, 67 (2012).  
 256 Technical Automation Servs. v. Liberty Surplus, 673 F.3d 399, 401, 404-05 
(5th Cir. 2012).  
 257 Id. at 407. 
 258 On June 24, 2013, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in In re 
Bellingham to resolve the issue of whether Article III permits the exercise of the 
judicial power of the United States by bankruptcy courts on the basis of litigant 
consent. Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc.), 
No. 11-35162, 2012 WL 6013836 (9th Cir. Dec. 4, 2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3582 
(U.S. June 24, 2013) (No. 12-1200).  
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Congress could respond in three ways. But only one course of 
action truly makes sense.  
First, Congress could pass a new set of amendments to 
redraw and further narrow the boundaries of bankruptcy court 
jurisdiction, as it did after Northern Pipeline. This response is 
overkill if the Chief Justice is to be taken at his word, for he 
wrote that Stern’s holding is narrow and only applies to 
counterclaims like Vickie’s. Whereas in Northern Pipeline, the 
Court invalidated the entire bankruptcy jurisdiction scheme, 
the Court in Stern opted to use a scalpel instead of a cleaver, 
ruling only that the bankruptcy court could not enter a final 
judgment on a state law counterclaim, which did not require 
resolution in order to administer the bankruptcy case pending 
before it. If Congress were to dismantle the bankruptcy regime 
and start from scratch, it would upset the expectations of both 
the litigants and the federal courts that have learned how to 
navigate and rely on the current system.  
Second, Congress could make bankruptcy courts more 
like magistrate courts. Congress could do this by heightening 
the appellate review standard for decisions rendered by 
bankruptcy courts on “core” claims, making the standard more 
comparable to that used by district courts when reviewing 
magistrate judges’ decisions on dispositive motions. Currently, 
magistrate judges’ decisions on dispositive motions are reviewed 
de novo while decisions on “core” claims by bankruptcy judges 
are reviewed under the deferential “clearly erroneous standard.” 
Furthermore, Congress could reduce the wide scope of 
remedies that bankruptcy courts are permitted to grant, which 
would make bankruptcy courts more like magistrate courts and 
other administrative law courts. Like the court in Crowell, for 
example, the bankruptcy court would depend on the district 
court for the enforcement of orders and judgments. While any 
change that would bring bankruptcy courts more in line with 
other non-Article III tribunals may soften the Court’s strict 
application of Article III to bankruptcy courts, heightened 
appellate review of core claims coupled with the reduction of 
bankruptcy courts’ remedial powers would have devastating 
consequences for litigants. Bankruptcy courts were created to 
provide debtors and creditors an alternative forum to resolve 
their disputes outside the traditional litigation channels, which 
are typically costly and time consuming. In the world of 
bankruptcy, time is money. If the debtor is truly going to 
receive a fresh start and the creditors are going to receive their 
fair share of the debtor’s assets, asset values can only be 
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preserved if the bankruptcy court maintains authority to grant 
powerful remedies in a timely fashion, without worrying about 
having their orders constantly overturned on appeal. 
The last option is for Congress to do nothing. Although 
this may seem like the least constructive option, it is likely the 
best course of action. As the federal courts start to realize the 
narrowness of Stern’s holding, and as commentators have 
taken time to digest it, business in the bankruptcy courts will 
likely continue as usual—with the occasional district court 
briefly putting down its rubber stamp to scrutinize a 
bankruptcy court decision more closely than usual. As the 
Chief Justice made clear, Stern will not change the status quo. 
For now, in the fashion of Estragon and Vladimir, the 
bankruptcy community resumes waiting for more definitive 
answers from the Supreme Court on the constitutionality of 
bankruptcy court jurisdiction.  
Joshua C. Gerber† 
  
 † J.D., Brooklyn Law School, 2013; B.A., Cornell University, 2008. I thank 
Professor Frederic Bloom for being my faithful guide through the chaotic universe of 
federal courts. A special thank you to Judge Martin Glenn, who, despite his busy docket, 
found time to discuss the intricacies of Stern with me, and to Judge Roy Babitt, who 
shared with me his transcripts of the congressional hearings on the 1978 Bankruptcy 
Reform Act and who has taught me much about history, bankruptcy, and otherwise. I am 
also in debt to Joshua Card, Rachel Tischler, Daniel Wityk, and Paul Sweeny of the 
Brooklyn Law Review for their insights and guidance. Finally, I thank my parents and 
Jackelyn Tannenholtz for their love and support. 
